How Drone Swarms Work—From Iran’s Shahed Attack to Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb

How Drones swarms work: From the Shahed attack of Iran to the Ukraine Spiderweb operation

By deni ellis béchard Edited by Dean Visser

Six hours after Israel’s air attacks in Iran last Friday, farmers in Iraq could have looked up and have seen the Iranian drones traveling west: more than 100 of them flew on a trip of 1,700 kilometers to Israel, with their propellers that buzzed like Wackers. Among them was the Shahed-136. Mainly composed of foam and plywood, each Shahed-136 drone is 3.5 meters long and has a wingspan of 2.5 meters and an eyelet of 40 to 50 kilograms in the nose. The “brain” of the drone, a sensor the size of a cough drop, measures each movement, while a GPS on board credit card size listening to microwave squeaks of navigation satellites. The Shahed route (its reference points in latitude, length and altitude) rises before a reinforcement rocket triggers it to heaven. And it is noisy: its 50 -horsepower engine is a bit more powerful than that of a Volkswagen Beetle of the 60s and would be as noisy as a corteped or a cyclomotor in the complete throttle of accelerator multiplied by 100 in what sometimes sometimes the military strategists.

Drona swarms can take different forms. In attacks such as the recent launch of Iran drones in Israel, or the use of Russia against Ukraine, where Shahed drones are nicknamed “flying cyclomotor”, the power of the swarm is in their numbers. A missile with a similar range can cost up or $ 1 million, but a shahed can be beaten for $ 20,000 to $ 50,000. The body of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard of Iran (IRGC) triggers them from portable or racks in trucks, and the small pulse rocket at the bottom of each drone hits him at the cruise speed before having fun. The Center for Strategic and International Studies describes the savings of drones and the tools “used both to Saturday’s aerial defenses and to attack objectives, disorder

Last Friday, when the more than 100 Iranian drones rose to Tel Aviv and were demolished by the combat aircraft, the Iron Dome Dome de Israel Air Defense system and a destroyer of the US Navy. Uu. In the Mediterranean, they could be based on its course. The Shahed, which means “witness” in Persa, is generally a “fire and forgetfulness” drone: it cannot transmit information or receive updated trajectories (although it is modeled in different ways, and some Shahed Eiiff drones). Rather, the power of the swarm of such attacks is based on its cost: at the end of last week, the IRGC could afford to fir A movement A movement A movement A movement A

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More complex swarm: Ukraine Operation Spiderweb

In the heart of most experimental swarms is the Boids algorithm, a concept introduced by the computer graphics researcher Craig Reynolds in an article in 1987. A BOID is a “bird object” or “AVE object”. In a Boids Model of a Flock, “Each simulated bird is implemented as an independence actor that Navigates Accordance to its local perception of the dynamic envies, The Laws of Simulated Physics That Rule ITS Motion, and a Set of Benaviors Program. RULES: EACH BOID SHOULD STAY CLOSE TO THE OTHERS (FLOCK CENERING), SHOULDN’T BUMP THEM (Collision AVOIDANCE) AND SHOULD FLY AT ROUGHLY THE SAME SPEED (Coincidence speed).

On June 1, less than two weeks before the exchanges between Israel and Iran, the platform trucks transported by wood were driven thousands or kilometers by unsuspecting drivers that the Ukrainian agents had hired. The trucks parked near the Russian air bases; The shed roofs got up and raised 117 Quadcopters drones. Each was the size of an average pizza box, had four rotors and a vision -based autonomy system and carried a payload that weighed only more than 3.2 kg. Piloado remotely by Ukrainian operators, the drones rushed towards long -range bombers in the Russian air bases. If the signal to the drones was delayed or lost or stuck, its autonomous systems lit. These systems had trained in images of long -range bombers to recognize strategic points in which they hit them. When the live camera feeding of each drone coincided with its preprogrammed objective, the machine strangled to full power and hit. The absence of continuous human direction and the ability to identify objectives autonomously represent the threshold where drone swarms are more than a mass launch. The Ukraine Security Service claims 41 aircraft were reached; Even conservative counts admit at least one boxes of bombers were destroyed.

THE STATE OF THE ART OF THE ENJAMBRES

Although being able to identify and pursue objectives can make a rudimentary swarm more dangerous, the ability to absorb the defender’s data, share that information with other drones and adapt to what is happening on the battlefield is much more lethal. This is precisely the technology that has tried in the White Sands missile range of New Mexico. In 2021, the United States Air Force conducted a series of tests in its Golden Horde Vanguard program that involves four collaborative small diameter pumps: when they retired, they can communicate to decide Wat Bomb Winde hit what goal. The tactic was tested inside a cloud simulator called color, where each weapon had a “digital twin” to develop strategies for real -time use. The initiative continues to simulate battles using collaborative and autonomous weapons systems.

But the Compensation Program of the Agency for Advanced Defense Research Projects (offensive tactics enabled in the swarm) pushes the idea even more, executing swarm drones tactics within a virtual environment based on the game in real time with the aim of having a single 250 drone pilot, in a aircraft system or a land system, through a simulated city. The swarm mapping Alys and would retreat a three -dimensional model, a Google Street view with teeth. While the recent attacks of Iran and Ukraine respectively respect the mass and boldness, offset and coliseum have tried to give the swarms the advantage of adaptive autonomy. China is running to close the Jiutian development gap, a “Mothership” drone 10 meters from a ton aimed at releasing 100 subdrons at large altitudes.

Everything that leaves us human under a sky that can soon house thousands of autonomous flight things, each smarter than a sparrow but smarter than us in a close way: the ability to immediately share everything they learn. Defenders can someday shoot a “spoofer”, an object that will send satellite navigation signs falsified in a convincing way that drones are blocked in false positions or even ran into each other as confused bees. Israel is developing lasers to cut the wings of Shahed drones, replacing the successful rockets that demolish them with an increase in energy as cheap as a subway ticket. But as the defense improves, the offensive will also do so, and the iteration cycle will probably turn more fast.